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Abstract
The paper proposes a concept enabling quantitative assessment of resilience in
critical entities developed in the European projects SmartResilience and InfraStress.
The concept aims at combining simple communication-related advantages of sim-
plified assessments results (such as “resilience very high” or “resilience very low”)
with the advantages of the in-depth assessments (e.g. analysis of multiple sensor
data). The paper describes the main elements of the innovative, indicator-based
concept, starting with the “resilience cube” at the top, and continuing with the
multi-level, hierarchical, indicator-based assessment methodology. The concept
allows analyzing and assessing different aspects of practical resilience management.
One can assess the resilience level of an entity at a given point in time, monitor their
resilience level over time and benchmark it. One can also model and analyze the
functionality of a system during a particular (threat) scenario, as well as stress-test
it. The same methodology allows to optimize investment in improving resilience
(e.g. in further training, in equipment, etc.), in a transparent and intuitive way.
A resilience indicator database (over 4,000 indicators available) and a suite of tools
(primarily developed within SmartResilience and InfraStress projects) and a
repository of over 20 application cases and 300 scenarios, support application of the
methodology. The concept has been discussed and agreed with over 50 different
organizational stakeholders and is being embedded into the new ISO 31050
standard currently under development. Its “life-after-the-project” will be ensured
by the dedicated “resilience rating initiative (ERRA)”. Although the concept and
the tool in the form of the “ResilienceTool” were developed primarily for the
resilience assessment of critical infrastructure (the “smart” ones in particular), they
can be used for resilience assessment of other systems and through the extension of
the, already initiated, implementation of AI techniques (machine learning) to make
the ResilienceTool even more versatile and easier to use in the future.
Keywords: resilience, risk assessment, critical infrastructure, resilience indicators,
risk and resilience
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1. Introduction: using indicators to assess and manage resilience of
critical infrastructures in SmartResilience and InfraStress projects
Modern critical infrastructures are becoming increasingly smarter (e.g. the
smart cities). Making the infrastructures smarter usually means making them
smarter in the normal operation and use: more adaptive, more intelligent etc.
But will these smart critical infrastructures behave smartly and be smartly
resilient also when exposed to extreme threats, such as extreme weather
disasters or terrorist attacks? If making an existing infrastructure smarter is
achieved by making it more complex, would it also make it more vulnerable? Which
aspect of resilience of a critical infrastructure will be affected the most? Its ability to
anticipate, to prepare for, to adapt and withstand, respond to, or to recover? What
are the resilience indicators (RIs) which one has to look at? These are the main
questions tackled by the SmartResilience project [1] to which a methodology
based on resilience indicators was developed, complete with the supporting
“ResilienceTool” to handle both existing (“conventional”) indicators suitable for
assessing the resilience of critical infrastructure as well as new “smart” resilience
indicators, e.g. those from Big Data (over 5,000 available in mid-2020). In the
InfraStress project [2], the concept and the tools are developed further and
integrated with the concept of situational awareness system (focus of the
InfraStress project).
2. Resilience as “one number”, ResilienceCube and the main concept
2.1 Resilience and resilience matrix
The definition of resilience, standing in the background of the concept presented
in this paper, has evolved along with the work on the development of the concept. It
started with the definition of the resilience as “The ability to anticipate, prepare for,
and adapt to changing conditions and withstand, respond to, and recover rapidly from
disruption”. The main amendment proposed afterward was the inclusion of the
ability to understand risks (current and emerging), leading to the definition of
“Resilience as the ability to understand risks, anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to
changing conditions and withstand, respond to, and recover rapidly from disruption” [3].
In the final stage, the project adopted the elaborated definition of the resilience of
an infrastructure is given below [4].
“Resilience of an infrastructure is the ability to understand and anticipate the risks –
including new/emerging risks – threatening the critical functionality of the infrastructure,
prepare for anticipated or unexpected disruptive events, optimally absorb/withstand
their impacts, respond and recover from them, and adapt/transform the infrastructure or
its operation based on lessons learned, thus improving the infrastructure anti-fragility.”
This definition enabled the following main advantages:
• Including emerging risks and a natural link to risk assessment
• Including the goals of optimization, adaptation and transformation and
• Including the improvement of anti-fragility, the concept of increased
importance for all smart systems, including smart infrastructures, and
• Enabling inclusion of the 5 phases of the resilience cycle and the indicator-
based approach within the resilience matrix.
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The definition allows analyzing the behavior of an infrastructure exposed to an
adverse event over a “scenario timeline” and simultaneously assessing the func-
tionality of an infrastructure over the “resilience cycle” as shown in Figure 1. While
the decomposition over the time-axis, i.e., defining the “phases” of the resilience
cycle, may be trivial, decomposition over the functionality axis is non-trivial as
functionality might have different “dimensions” (see chapter 2.3). The
SmartResilience concept proposes the decomposition over a 5  5 resilience matrix,
defining 5 phases and 5 “dimensions”.
The approach allows to represent the overall resilience cycle, and focus on single
relevant issues. The issues, in turn, can be described by means of indicators and
these can have values, thus, providing the possibility to quantitatively describe each
“cell” of the resilience matrix (Figure 2).
Phase I, understand risks, is applicable prior to an adverse event. It emphasizes
emerging risks and includes their early identification and monitoring; e.g. what
could the “adverse event” be? This is followed by.
Phase II, anticipate/prepare, also applicable before the occurrence of an adverse
event. It includes planning and proactive adaptation strategies, possibly also
“smartness in preparation” [5].
Phase III, absorb/withstand, comes into action during the initial phase of the
event and shall include the vulnerability analysis and the possible cascading/ripple
effects; e.g. “how steep” is the absorption curve, and “how deep” down will it go?
Phase IV, respond/ recover, is related to getting the adverse event under control
as soon as possible, influencing the “how long” will it last, question. Further, it
Figure 1.
The 5  5 resilience matrix, mapping the critical infrastructure system functionality over 5 phases of the
resilience cycle.
Figure 2.
Possible outcomes of case of an infrastructure exposed to an adverse event: Between improvement and complete
failure.
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includes the post event recovery; e.g. “how steep up” is the recovery curve for
normalization of the functionality? It is followed by.
Phase V, adapt/learn, which encompass all kinds of improvements made on the
infrastructure and its environment; e.g. affecting “how well” the infrastructure is
adapted after the event, and whether it is more resilient and “sustainable”. The
activities in this phase also lead to preparation for future events and hence, this
resilience curve also exhibits a reoccurring cycle [5].
The dimensions help in categorizing the indicators. The system/physical dimen-
sion includes technological aspects, as well as the physical/technical networks being
part of a given infrastructure, and the interconnectedness with other infrastructures
and systems. The information/data dimension is related to the technical systems.
The organizational/business dimension covers business-related aspects, financial
and HR aspects as well as different types of respective organizational networks. The
societal/political dimension encompasses broader societal and social contexts.
Finally, the cognitive/decision-making dimension, accounts for perception aspects
(e.g. perceptions of threats and vulnerabilities) [6].
2.2 Difference and relationship between a risk matrix and a resilience matrix
One should distinguish well between the risk matrix and the resilience matrix.
Although similar in shape and appearance, their basic purpose and principles are
different. The main purpose of a risk matrix is to show the position of a given risk
(defined through its scenario) on a 2-dimensional “map”, depicting the likelihood/
probability of a given risk and its possible impact/consequences. Risk is then, for a
given scenario, calculated as the product of the two. The higher the probability/
likelihood, the higher the impacts/consequences – the higher the risk.
Risk-oriented standards (e.g. EN 16991:20181 [7]) provide detailed examples of
how to use a risk matrix in given areas. Using a risk matrix (sometimes referred as
“risk map”), one can easily compare e.g. two risks – provided that the likelihood/
probabilities and impact/consequences can be assessed.
The resilience matrix, on the other hand, serves to map the resilience of a system
(e.g. a critical infrastructure such as a large power plant) during an adverse event (e.g.
crisis, accident, cyber-attack, etc.). The time of the event is then usually subdivided
into phases (Figure 3(a)), usually 4 or 5, of the event, from the time before the very
event to the time after the event (the “resilience cycle”). The time of the event/
scenario (see also Figure 4) is thus, the first and the main dimension of the resilience
matrix. As the adverse event, in a general case, will affect different areas of activities,
e.g. business, society, information, management, etc. the event is usually looked at for
each of them in terms of their own indicators. These areas are often (e.g. in EU
projects such as InfraStress [2] or SmartResilience [1, 8–12]), called dimensions, and
their number is usually chosen as equal to the number of phases. The result is then a
matrix (the “resilience matrix”, Figure 3(a)), mapping the resilience of the given
system – e.g. suggesting the communication “dimension” in the response “phase” of
the crisis management of COVID (e.g. in the UK2) was “poor” (Figure 3(b)).
In the approach presented here, we propose that the qualifier “poor” is linked to
the measurable indicators (resilience indicators) such as e.g. reliability of numbers
communicated to the public, statistic/sentiment in social media, survey results, etc.
In such a case, the label “poor” is supported also by quantitative indicators and can
be given an aggregated value (e.g. acc. to the value  weight formula).
1 https://www.cen.eu/news/brief-news/pages/news-2018-011.aspx (Convener A. Jovanovic).
2 https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/communications-coronavirus-crisis-lessons-second-wave
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Generally, the aggregation process for indicators in the method and the tool
described (see Figure 5) here offer the following main aggregation options:
1.The simple aggregation of the indicators put on the common 0–5 scale
2.The weighted aggregation as an extension of the simple method
3.The JRC composite indicators and scoreboard (COIN) methodology3
4.The Fuzzy-AHP based weight determination [13]
5.The ranking-based weight determination [11]
2.3 “Measuring” resilience by means of issues and indicators
In the concept, an “issue” is a general term referring to anything important in
order to be resilient against severe threats such as terror attacks, cyber threats and
extreme weather. It is telling what is important, e.g., it can be “training” performed
in the anticipate/prepare phase. Obviously, the more indicators one chooses, the
better the “coverage” of an issue is going to be (Figure 5), but it is also obvious that
Figure 3.
Example of a 5x5 resilience matrix (a) as compared to a risk matrix (b).
3 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/coin-tool-user-guide
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the larger the number of indicators, the more complex their handling is going to be.
The “way out” has two components and these would be:
• finding the “right number” of indicators acc. to the resilience problem tackled (in
the usual engineering practice,managed by humans, 120–150 indicators are usually
amaximum – themore critical the situation, the smaller the number; in absolute
emergency situations humans can hardly look atmore than 3 indicators), and
• allowing to “drill-down” in cases when one or more indicators need further
explanation.
In order to organize the analysis and enable drilling down to the base assessment
elements, the selected scenario is segmented into six levels [1]. This practice is based on
several previousmethods, notably the ANL/Argonnemethod [14], the Leading Indica-
tors ofOrganizationalHealth (LIOH)method [15–17], theUS-DHSmethod [18], and the
Resilience-based EarlyWarning Indicator (REWI)method [19]. The ANL/Argonne
method for assessing a resilience index (RI) is structured in 5 levels, providing indicators
on the lowest level and a similar hierarchy is used in the SmartResilience and InfraStress
projects for assessing resilience levels, entering the indicators on level six.
The “resilience indicators” are mainly taken from current practices (standards,
guidelines, reports, etc.) within safety and risk management, emergency prepared-
ness, business continuity, etc. and in most cases, they exist already as safety indica-
tors, risk indicators, or similar (e.g. those proposed by OECD, GRI, API, HSE, IAEA
and other organizations). Collecting the indicators and applying the approach, the
theoretical framework for variable selection, weighting, and aggregation must be
defined [20] and the basis for this is the context of the assessment, or scenario. An
example of a “resilience indicator data sheet” is given Appendix 1.
The values of indicators, often for one and the same indicators, can come from
experts (e.g. as qualifiers – “high”, “very low””, etc.), from measured or monitored
Figure 4.
Functionality level of the smart critical infrastructure over scenario time – The value of the FL at a particular
time is calculated by aggregating the relevant indicators scores starting from FL at t0 = 100%.
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values (e.g. numbers of accidents), or from big data analysis. Single, real values,
from any of the above sources, in the methodology, can be yes/no questions,
numbers, percentages, fuzzy numbers, or some other type. Once in the model, for
the communication with the end-user, they are, in a general case, transferred into
the score, on a scale 0 to 5.
2.4 Dynamic checklists of resilience issues and indicators
One of the ways to use resilience issues and indicators practically [21], is to put
them into “lists” (checklist) and in the concept it is done in a dynamic way, allowing
to dynamically create checklist appropriate for a given case using available indicators
or adding new ones to the list. In order to make the creation/drafting of these dynamic
checklists (DCLs) easier and allow for comparison and benchmarking of results, the
user is encouraged to use the list suggested by the concept, namely (Figure 6):
• The CORE DCLs, containing the indicators suggested for virtually all
infrastructures,
• The RECOMMENDED DCLs, containing indicators suggested for the
particular type of infrastructures and
• The USER’s DCL, containing indicators specific for a particular infrastructure.
Figure 5.
Issues measured by indicators (above), allow to make the bridge between a given, e.g. measured value of an
indicator, and the overall, final resilience index & ResilienceCube (below).
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2.5 Assessing resilience an infrastructure during an adverse event:
Functionality level (FL)
The indicator-based approach is proposed by the SmartResilience and
InfraStress projects also for modeling of the behavior of the infrastructure during a
particular disruptive event (scenario). In this case, the (critical) functionality of an
infrastructure is analyzed during scenario time (Figure 2). No matter how intui-
tively one might say that the critical functionality of an infrastructure is easy to
define, in practice, especially quantitative terms, it is not. E.g., the functionality of
an airport is to “keep the air traffic going” or that the critical functionality of a
refinery is “to produce the gasoline”, but these are often difficult to measure. E.g.,
in the air traffic, one can look at the number of passengers boarding and/or on cargo
throughput, but should at the same time look at the compliance with, e.g., safety
and environmental norms, because not satisfying the latter could also be a loss of
critical functionality. In the concept, these are considered to be
• The ELEMENTS of the functionality (corresponding to the “issues”), and for
this one can define
• The (FUNCTIONALITY) INDICATORS, just as in the case of resilience level
assessment.
Defining the functionality in the above way enables to precisely and quantita-
tively define the resilience curve in scenario time, e.g. for the main characteristic
points in time [22]:
t0: time before the event or starting point of the scenario.
t1: time at which the event occurs.
t2: time at which the infrastructure reaches the minimum functionality level.
t3: time at which the infrastructure starts to recover.
t4: time at which the infrastructure reaches the initial functionality level or
starting point of a new steady-state level.
t5: time at which the infrastructure increases its functionality through learning
and adapting or at which the scenario ends.
Based on the resilience curve (or functionality curve), it is then possible to
define the resulting macro-indicators, as illustrated in the notional diagram in
Figure 4, such as:
• Robustness [%]
• Absorption time [h]
Figure 6.
Hierarchical structure of the checklist in the concept.
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• Downtime [h]
• Loss of functionality [% over h]
• Recovery time [h]
• Recovery rate [%]
• Disruption time [h]
• Improvement/adaptation/transformation [%]
It should be noted that these are the RESULTING macro-indicators, and not the
INPUT indicators as the resilience indicators and functional indicators mentioned
above. These macro-indicators can also be used for “stress-testing”, in which case
these can be compared with the critical thresholds (e.g. for the maximum loss of
functionality, duration or a combination of these, etc.).
Robustness characterizes the absorbing capacity of the smart critical infrastructure
[23]. NL uses robustness as defined by the National Infrastructure Advisory Council
(NIAC) [24], i.e. “the ability tomaintain critical operations and functions in the face of
crisis” [25]. It can be seen as the protection and preparation of a system facing a specific
danger. The objective of the robustness component is to identifymeasures that can help
the systemwithstand or adapt to a hazard. It emphasizes the ability of an infrastructure
towithstand the incident if the protectivemeasures fail. It also integrates the capacity of
the infrastructure to function in a degraded state. The importance of robustness is not
necessarily defined by how the infrastructure continues to function in the face of an
incident but rather by how it is able to continue to accomplish itsmission and to provide
its products and services through preventative measures, mitigation, or absorption
capabilities [25]. Robustness is defined as the capacity of the smart critical infrastruc-
ture to endure the effects of a negative event and thereby absorb its impact. As shown in
Figure 4, it is measured as the ratio of the percentage of the lowest FL after the





Absorption time is defined as the time during which the smart critical infra-
structure absorbs a disruptive event while the smart critical infrastructure
undergoes a decrease in its functionality level. As illustrated in Figure 4, it is
measured as the difference between t2 and t1.
Absorption time ¼ t2  t1 (2)
Loss of functionality is the functionality of the smart critical infrastructure
lost in a given threat situation. It is measured by the area of the curve
(an approximation) between the time when the smart critical infrastructure starts
to lose its functionality (t1) to the time when it reaches the initial state (t4) (see
Figure 4). The approximation is done for the area above the curve to a well-defined
shape, e.g. a triangle. The output would be the percentage loss of functionality in
time [26, 27], e.g. losing 10% in 10 hours.
Loss of functionality ¼
ðt4
t1
FLt1  FL tð Þ½ dt (3)
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FL in all the formulae (incl. Eq. (3), is calculated as the aggregated score on
indicators, in the particular case of FL, as functionality indicators, such as those
presented in the sample list in Figure 7).
Next in the scenario is the recovery state of the smart critical infrastructure. The
concept of recovery explains the passage of an infrastructure’s functionality from a
degraded state to one of acceptable operation. This concept builds on the concept of
robustness in that, if measures of robustness fail to fully prevent, mitigate, or allow
the asset to absorb the damage event, recovery constrains the impacts of the event
to keep the CI functional. For the purpose of modeling the impact of a disruptive
event, recovery refers to the ability to not only return to acceptable operating levels
but also to recover fully from the effects of an event [25] in the maximum allow-
able/acceptable recovery time (as described in the stress test methodology [12, 28]).
Downtime is defined as the time duration for which the system is not func-
tional. In Ref. to critical infrastructures, this could apply if the CI stops functioning.
In this case, the functionality level of the infrastructure remains below the thresh-
old level of functionality [25]. It can be measured as the difference in time between
t3 and t2 (see Figure 4).
Downtime ¼ t3  t2 (4)
Note: This calculation is conducted when the threshold level of functionality is
defined (Here it is assumed that the threshold level is FLt2 (=FLt3)).
Recovery time is defined as the time at which the smart critical infrastructure
recovers from the disruptive event and gains its initial or desired functionality [23].
It can be measured as the time taken to recover the functionality level, i.e. the time
between time t3 and t4.
Figure 7.
Example of creating a DCL by combining generic (CORE DCL), typical (RECOMMENDED DCL) and
specific issues/indicators into the final DCL.
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Recovery time ¼ t4  t3 (5)
Note: Since the functionality level at the end of the scenario may be different
from at the start of the scenario, the recovery time may have to be measured at a
new steady-state level [28].
Recovery rate is defined as the rate at which the smart critical infrastructure
recovers from a disruptive event and gets back to its initial functionality level [23].
It characterizes the recovery trajectories of the smart critical infrastructure from the
point it starts recovering from the scenario to the final recovery. It is measured as
the ratio of change in functionality level between time t3 and t4.
Recovery rate ¼
FL4  FL3ð Þ
t4  t3ð Þ
(6)
Another measure considered for modeling the impact is disruption time.
The disruption time is defined as the total time taken by the CI to recover. It is also
seen as a measure for recover capacity of the smart critical infrastructure to return
to the desired functionality level [23]. In the functionality level over time (FL-t)
curve, it is the time between when the event occurs, i.e. at time t1, and time when
the smart critical infrastructure has fully recovered, i.e. t4 (see Figure 4).
Disruption time ¼ t4  t1 (7)
Improvement/adaptation/transformation: Final recovery of the FL of a smart
critical infrastructure could be equal to, better than, or worse than the original FL
[29]. Hence, the model allows for the calculation of the “improvement/adaptation/
Figure 8.
An example of a report of one of the resilience assessments – FL curve comparing the response of FL with scenario
time for case studies ECHO and CHARLIE, including the comparison of the FL curves with the acceptance level
(shown in pink, can be used for stress-testing, too).
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transformation.” This is the capacity of the smart critical infrastructure to learn
from a disruptive event (e.g. a revision of plans, modification of procedures, intro-
duction of new tools and technologies [10]) (see Figure 4). It is measured as the





Such macro indicators are ideal for comparing the FL responses for multiple case
studies, infrastructure, entities etc. They allow an objective evaluation of not only
how the functionality level of a system might react to an event but also how and
when it can recover. Using a theoretical acceptance level, a stress-test can also be
performed. An illustrative example comparing the FL response for two
SmartResilience case studies (ECHO and CHARLIE) is shown in Figure 8 and
Table 1.
3. Practical application of the ResilienceCube and the methodology for
resilience assessment
The indicator-based resilience concept described above, enables practical
assessment of the following aspects of resilience (Figure 9):
1.Resilience Index (Resilience as “one number“) and the ResilienceCube
(preparedness, robustness, adaptation/transformation)
2.Assessing resilience of an infrastructures over time – the Resilience Level (RL)
3.Assessing resilience of an infrastructure during an adverse event – the
Functionality Level (FL)
4.Assessing resilience of “multiple infrastructures“: Multi-level resilience
assessment
5.Modeling interaction and dependencies, visualizing resilience
6.Comparing resilience of different infrastructures: Benchmarking
Macro Indicator Values for ECHO Values for CHARLIE
Robustness [%] 42 20
Absorption time [h] 1 284
Downtime [h] 2 192
Loss of functionality [% over h] 58% in 282 h 80% in 284 h
Recovery time [h] 279 192
Recovery rate [%] 17 26
Disruption time [h] 0 284
Table 1.
Themacro indicator values for the cases in Figure 8 - the macro indicators calculated from the FL curve provide a
quantitative way of comparing alternatives of system recovery supporting decisionmaking and optimization [1].
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7.Checking resilience: Stress-testing
8.Optimizing resilience: Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM)
For its users, the methodologies are embedded into the interactive, web-based
and freely available “ResilienceTool”. Applied in different case studies, dealing with
energy, transportation, health, smart cities, water, sensitive installations, etc., the
methodology and tool provide the user with different options when using the
approach and the system by showing how benchmarking can be done and the best-
practice solutions can be re-used.
When applying the concept and the methodologies practically, it is important to
understand that the flexibility of the concept and the methodologies necessarily
demand for domain expertise in “configuring” the resilience model for a specific
area/city or critical infrastructure. A fixed list of critical infrastructures for cities in
Europe does not exist, and it must be up to each user of the concept, methodologies
and the software tool, to decide which feature of respective infrastructures should
be analyzed and how. Similarly, no fixed list of threats exists, neither on the area
level nor for the single critical infrastructures. Thus, it will be up to the users to
define which threats (scenarios) they consider relevant. Domain experts are needed
in order to define the important issues, and how to measure these issues, i.e.
identifying the indicators. They are in a way “configuring” the resilience model,
which largely is a one-time effort prior to using the model for calculating the
resilience levels, although some adjustments, tuning, and reconsiderations are
expected. Thus, in the implementation phase, it is important to have close collabo-
ration between the users, the method developers, and IT developers (of calculation
and presentation tools).
3.1 Resilience index/cube, resilience level (RL), functionality level (FL) and
multi-level resilience assessment
Per default, assessing resilience in the concept is based on scoring (other ways of
upwards aggregation are possible, but used only in “expert mode”), the scores being
Figure 9.
Applying the methodologies in order to assess resilience and obtain practical (quantitative) results.
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aggregated upwards – up to the Resilience Index score. At each level, the scores can
be assigned weights, as the indicators, too. When performing the resilience assess-
ment, the indicators’ real values are entered into the calculation, and the issue
scores are obtained as average weighted scores of the indicator scores. It is possible
to let a specific indicator overrule the effect of the other indicators, i.e. having
“knock out indicators” where, in the case of a low value, the effect is not “averaged
away” through an average weighted score of all the indicators. The reasoning
behind the selected scales is that a scale from 0 to 5 for indicators (and issues) are
sufficiently broad, especially if there are needs to perform expert judgments to
provide scores for the indicators (or directly for the issues) in case of lack of data
[17]. This has similarities to the use of safety integrity levels (SIL) for safety-
instrumented systems [30]. In and for the cases where the issue-indicator approach
is not sufficient, the concept and the tool allow using multi-level indicators
(de facto composite indicators).
3.2 Modeling interaction and dependencies, visualizing resilience
SmartResilience and InfraStress projects look at interdependencies between
infrastructures to understand how, in a case of a problem in one of them, the
functionality of others can be impacted. The assessment is based on issues and
indicators: these issues and indicators that are shared by different infrastructures
indicate “lines of interconnectedness and interdependency”. The infrastructures
involved and the issues/indicators form thus the logical network that can analyze
in order to model the propagation of influences from one infrastructure to
another. Thus, the cascading and ripple effects can be modeled and the dynamic
behavior of the network (“infrastructure-of-infrastructures”) analyzed
Figure 10).
The network in Figure 10 is created as the case applied onto the indicators
applicable to six types of infrastructures in SmartResilience project (health, ICT,
energy, water, transportation, industry) and looking at the core, recommended and
specific indicators (Figure 6). About 2,000 indicators were considered. The
Figure 10.
Interdependencies among multiple infrastructures as a network: Common indicators define the
interdependencies.
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analysis has included the web-semantics-based analysis of the descriptions of
indicators and the statistical analysis of the values of these indicators in the case
studies performed in SmartResilience project. The analysis has also served as the
basis for the,more user-oriented visualization of interdependencies in a critical
infrastructure.
3.3 Comparing resilience of different infrastructures: benchmarking
Using issues and indicators from pre-approved and standardized sources such as
the CORE and Recommended DCLs allows for the additional benefit of
benchmarking certain aspects of resilience management across different organiza-
tions. As the CORE issues are expected to be present in every Complete DCL,
organizations can at the very least be compared based on managerial, resilience-
oriented activities and processes, regardless of industry or threat. WITHIN a
particular scenario (industry and threat), Complete DCLs can be benchmarked
when using the Recommended issues proposed by the industry’s experts.
Once the CORE DCL issues are selected, the user can make an actual
resilience assessment adding the indicators under the CORE issues. Since for all of
the case studies, the Recommended DCLs have been developed, one can take a
look at those lists and choose which indicators from there fit into the CORE DCL.
It may happen that the names of the issues from Recommended DCL are slightly
different from the CORE ones. Hence, it is possible that not all the previously
used indicators will fit. In this case, the user should use only the ones which match
with the CORE issue. Furthermore, it may be needed that new indicators (not
used in the Recommended DCL) are added in order to ensure sufficient coverage
of the CORE issue.
3.4 Checking resilience: stress testing
The stress test framework is used to test whether, in a given threat situation, the
smart critical infrastructure is/will be resilient enough to be able to continue func-
tioning within the prescribed limits. The FL curve(s) obtained in the analysis is
compared with the stress test criteria and limits in order to evaluate whether the
smart critical infrastructure has passed or failed the stress test. In order to do the
stress test, the user needs to decide on the thresholds/limits representing
acceptable/non-acceptable values for each criterion. The stress test criteria can be
related to (e.g.):
• Functionality Level
• Time (to absorb, to recover)
• Cumulative loss of functionality (area)
Functionality Level (“vertical loss”): the stress test limits can be set based on the
overall functionality level, at single functionality element(s), and/or at single func-
tionality indicator(s). The limit could be a certain minimum level of functionality
(i.e. the lowest point of the resilience curve should be above this FLmin). The
functionality level at the lowest point below the curve is sometimes referred to as
“robustness,” which can be set as a stress test limit.
Time (“horizontal loss”): when subjected to a threat/event, a smart critical
infrastructure may set the limits on time (e.g. maximum time to absorb the event,
maximum time to partially recover after the event, or maximum time to fully
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recover after the event). The last time interval, i.e. time between when the event
occurs and the smart critical infrastructure is fully recovered, is referred to as
disruption time when modeling the impact of a disruptive event. This is some-
times also referred to as “rapidity” and can typically be used as a stress test limit.
For example, the stress test limit could be the time from when the event occurs
until 90% of the functionality is restored, or some combination of various
criteria.
3.5 Optimizing resilience: Multi-criteria decision making (MCDM)
Given that the purpose of the resilience and functionality level assessments is to
reveal weaknesses, either isolated or in comparison with others (benchmarking),
implementation of improvement measures is expected to be required. Which
improvement measure(s) will be optimal to choose? Given a set of alternatives/
options various criteria need to be weighed against each other. This could typically
include the effect on resilience (e.g. higher RL), costs and time to implement the
measure(s), but also other criteria may be relevant. The method used to decide on
optimal improvement measures is a Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM)
method and given that the nature of smart critical infrastructures and the resilience
issues that they evoke tend to mix both quantitative (budgeting, performance
indicators, etc.) and qualitative (expectations, procedures, etc.) aspects, it has to be
able to address both semantic-logic and crisp numbers. Logical Multi-criteria
decision-making (MCDM) methods are also preferable over other alternative
decision-making frameworks because MCDM methods have “the potential capabil-
ity of improving the transparency, analytic rigor, auditability and conflict resolution of
decision-makers” [31]. Correspondingly, the MCDM provides:
• Means to establish accountability and transparency behind decisions,
which may otherwise have unclear rationale and motives [25] by: placing
stress on clearly stating and weighting the decision criteria, thereby
improving transparency, and by ensuring that decisions taken through this
method are explicit, paving the way to audit past decisions and thus
provide accountability [32].
• Means for conflict resolution. This becomes a crucial issue when multiple
perspectives are applied to a single smart critical infrastructure management
decision [20, 24].
• Path for engagement and participation. Besides aiding decisions related to
engineering, scientific studies, and cost analysis, one aspect that is becoming
very crucial in decision-making studies is the engagement of multi-
stakeholders and participation of communities [32].
The project considered various in-depth MCDM approaches that were used in
other projects such as AIRM, PROMETHEE, and ELECTRE. However, during the
eight case studies included in the SmartResilience and InfraStress projects, all of
which involve end-user-owners of smart critical infrastructures, it became clear
that the complexity of these methods made understanding them much more
difficult and, at the same time, the required processing of the data needed proving
to be prohibitively time consuming and expensive. Once an analysis is prepared and
assessment data is input into the model (available on the project’s ResilienceTool),
the different optimization alternatives are scored following the combination of the
user’s input with the weighted criteria to rank the alternatives.
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4. Implementation of the ResilienceCube concept in the
“ResilienceTool”and merging it with the situational awareness
systems
To support the methodology, a complete online tool was developed in which all the
aspects described above were implemented with its intended user in mind - the person
within a city or area, or a specific smart critical infrastructure [13]. The tool is based on
the concept and its methodologies (the Cube, Figure 11), on the data resulting from
extremely wide use (over 5,000 issues/indicators, over 300 assessments). In addition
to the tools needed to support the ResilienceCube related analysis, presented above
(database, methodologies, reporting), the tool contains also the Moodle-based educa-
tion platform, support for standardization, a knowledge base (e.g. glossary) and a
series of own and external tools linked to the system. Currently over a dozen of
subsystems, containing all the features of the full system, but operating on the respec-
tive “private” databases are available for external users opted for the use of the system.
5. Application of the concept and the tool
The project [1], covered over 30 case studies, (e.g. Figures 8 and 12).
6. Towards integration of resilience and situational awareness
Following the generally accepted position, that integration of all the aspects
(concepts, data, tools, policies, implementation, etc.) is essential for successful risk
and resilience governance, the InfraStress project of the EU [2] has developed an
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The approach has been implemented in its five “pilots”, cases covering “sensi-
tive industrial plants and infrastructures”, exposed to cyber-physical threats. The
pilots cover chemical and pharmaceutical plants, ports, industrial zones, petro-
chemical plants, storage plants and similar. For all the plants the resilience has been
analyzed, the analysis integrated with analysis of situational awareness systems
performance (e.g. anti-drone systems or cyber protection systems), and, finally
embedded into a testbed stress-testing concept for different scenarios.
7. Standardizing the concept: ISO 31050
The main calling of ISO 31050 (ISO New Work Item (NWI) 31050 “Guidance
for Managing Emerging Risks to Enhance Resilience”4), is to provide universal, yet
meaningful guidance on developing new competencies and business models to
create relevant and realistic recommendations in an ever-changing uncertain world.
The standard itself aims to provide the much-needed foresight and insight to deal
with the rapidly changing landscape of risk due to the slew of new uncertainties and
new emerging risks, the management of which is essential for society. It is based on
the idea that these, emerging risks, are those that can challenge the resilience of the
critical infrastructures the most. It aims to integrate and align the (emerging) risk
Figure 12.
Visualization of interdependencies based on indicators: User-oriented (InfraStress project).
4 https://www.iso.org/standard/54224.html
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framework with resilience framework (definitions, concepts, requirements) and
propose outputs such as a procedure for scanning for emerging risks, metrics for
assessing possible impacts of those risks on critical infrastructure’s resilience. The
management framework, guidance for interoperability and common/agreed indi-
cators, as well as the particular considerations related to emerging risks in resilience
assessment. ISO 31050 will be part of the ISO 31000:2018 family of standards,
monitored by the ISO Technical Committee TC262.
8. Conclusions
The ResilienceCube allows presenting the resilience of a critical infrastructure as
a single point (Resilience Index) in a 3D space. The concept, especially as
implemented in the tool (the ResilienceTool) is user-friendly, intuitively
Figure 13.
InfraStress framework integrating resilience analysis and situational awareness and its application to resilience
improvement decision-making: Within the overall framework (a), the embedded MCDM modules
communicate with other modules and get values through a Kafka broker, and lead to the resilience assessment
based decision optimization (b).
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understandable and flexible. It supports end-users (authorities, critical infrastruc-
ture operators and owners) in improving the disaster resilience of respective critical
infrastructures through indicator-based assessment of their resilience capabilities.
This solution provided by SmartResilience and InfraStress projects is oriented
towards the practical needs of end-users and has been developed in close collabora-
tion with all relevant stakeholders. In order to achieve the Technology Readiness
Level (TRL) beyond the initially planned 4, the Tool is being tested and constantly
improved through the development of realistic use cases, both within and beyond
the projects.
The SmartResilience and InfraStress ResilienceTool are envisaged to stay avail-
able, free of charge for the registered ERRA members, also after the project end.
The main ERRA service (risk and resilience “Assessment-as-a-service”) will be
performed by the Agency together with and subcontracting to Agency member
organizations (organizational members and individuals) which have the different
competencies needed to meet the specific needs of specific industry branches or
application areas (e.g. critical infrastructures or new technologies). In the most
general terms, ERRA would contact and negotiate with the customers, engage the
experts among the Agency members, process the contracts with the customer, and
guarantee the quality of assessment provided by the Agency. Main Agency services
would be the self-assessment, the audited self-assessment and the third party audit,
similarly to the services of GRI (www.globalreporting.org).
The concepts and the tools were applied to the analysis of health infrastructures
(over 100 hospitals) in a COVID-like scenario [33]. The concept allows integrating
the qualitative approaches with those based on a more complex quantitative resil-
ience analysis (e.g. [30, 34, 35] or [22]). In addition, the work in the background of
this paper has clearly shown, that the current research on resilience has a number of
different aspects: from those focusing on the “resilience of and within a network”
(e.g. in the area of electric grids or transportation networks - Figure 14), to those
looking at resilience as “ability of an organization to absorb and adapt in a changing
environment” [36]. The latter, obviously not necessarily requiring a network, or
measuring it within a network. Both approaches, on the other hand, are applicable
to critical infrastructures.
To conclude, within the plethora of the “current” existing tools (e.g. those
presented or reviewed in [25, 37–42] or [43]), that all can simulate different resil-
ience aspects of large and complex systems and/or apply optimization techniques to
improve it (e.g. by indicating the optimum path towards system recovery or
improving preparedness to unknowns) the approach presented here proposes a
pragmatic and flexible way to achieve improvement through applying resilience
indicators. It has been “combat-tested” in a number of large-scale cases and it has
confirmed being robust and combinable with the systems previously on site.
Finally, the concepts might have one of an even more ambitious potential allo-
cation: the biggest infrastructure of all is the “infrastructure of all infrastructures”
of our planet Earth and the “global society”. Technically, the methodology
presented here can be applied for this case too, allowing to quantify the global
Figure 14.
Resilience of a network (graph representation) – Not always the same as the engineering resilience of an
organization, defined by ISO as “ability of an organization to absorb and adapt in a changing environment”
(ISO 23316, https://www.iso.org/obp/ui#iso:std:iso:22316:ed-1:v1:en).
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resilience (note: we do not have anything better around yet!) and point out where
the “investment in the improvement of the global infrastructure” will be the most
effective and beneficial.
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